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Asset price fluctuations give grounds for concern in the major industrialised countries. But to what
extent do they affect economic growth? The answer to this question partly depends on
households’ levels of debt and the structure of their financial wealth.
We shall first summarise the different wealth effect estimates. This analysis shows that the impact
of asset price fluctuations is more pronounced in the United States and the United Kingdom than in
euro area countries. Asset price fluctuations in the United States appear to have an even greater
impact on euro area growth than changes in household wealth within the euro area. Overall, outside
of the United States and the United Kingdom, wealth effects are fairly limited, despite the existence
of spillover effects transmitted through international trade and/or financial markets.
Furthermore, these findings seem to be consistent with those obtained using other quantitative
approaches that analyse the co-movements between business and financial cycles. They also conclude
that, apart from in the United States, a high degree of dependence between economic growth and
asset price fluctuations in the short term cannot be identified.
We shall then provide an international comparison of the financial position of households (United
States, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy). This analysis points to a certain
degree of heterogeneity. In particular, the financial vulnerability of US and UK households, which
have a larger appetite for debt and risky assets, is greater than that of households of the major euro
area countries.
In this context, it is not surprising that the shocks affecting asset prices have a more marked effect on
household consumption and growth in the United States and the United Kingdom than in the major
euro area countries or in Japan.Do asset price fluctuations constitute a risk to growth in the major industrialised countries?
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1|1 Measuring wealth effects
Households’ net wealth, which is the difference
between the assets they hold and their borrowing,
varies according to current debt and savings flows
and changes in the value of assets held over the
previous period. If we compare changes in
households’ wealth and economic growth, both
variables appear to be fairly well correlated in most
of the countries under review, with phases of
decorrelation generally corresponding to periods
of sharp increases in debt levels or to major asset
price fluctuations.
1| Implications for household consumption
The existence of wealth effects remains a controversial
issue. Some authors such as Poterba and Samwick
(1995) opine that while there is indeed a correlation
between stock market fluctuations and changes in
consumption, it in no way corresponds to a causality
link reflecting a wealth effect, but rather to the fact
that stock market indices are a leading indicator of
activity. Consumption fluctuates in the same way
because it is one of the components of demand and
because it is correctly anticipated by stock markets.
Nevertheless, numerous empirical studies identify
wealth effects arising from households’ equity holdings.
Charts 1
Comparison of trends in households’ net wealth and GDP
(annual growth rate as a percentage)
Sources: OECD, authors’ calculations
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1|2 Estimating wealth effects arising
from stock price fluctuations
More specifically, the impact of fluctuations in net
wealth on consumption and consequently on growth
can be measured in two ways:
– the marginal propensity to consume out of
financial wealth (MPC), which is the change in
value terms of consumption (C) for a 1%
fluctuation in wealth (A);
– the elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth
( A C/ e  ), which measures the percentage change
in consumption for a 1% fluctuation in wealth.
We can link the two as follows: 
C
A
MPC
A C /
= e .
Elasticity can thus also be expressed as the ratio
between the marginal and the average propensity
to consume.
The table below summarises the results from a
number of sources. While it is far from exhaustive,
it aims to provide an estimate of elasticities with
respect to financial wealth by country. These
countries may differ in terms of their financial
structures and their households’ investment
behaviour.
In general, estimates, such as they are presented in
empirical studies, are obtained using three main
methods:
– method 1 features a calculation of elasticities
using the MPC, see Bertaut (2002), Ludvingson
and Steindel (1999), IMF World Economic
Outlook (2000), Boone et al. (1998);
s e t a t S d e t i n Un a p a Jm o d g n i K d e t i n Uy n a m r e Ge c n a r Fy l a t I
1 d o h t e M1 8 0 . 09 1 0 . 00 6 0 . 02 1 0 . 02 1 0 . 08 1 0 . 0
2 d o h t e M4 6 0 . 02 2 0 . 07 4 0 . 02 1 0 . 05 1 0 . 05 1 0 . 0
3 d o h t e M3 1 1 . 08 0 0 . 06 5 0 . 05 1 0 . 00 3 0 . 03 2 0 . 0
e g a r e v A 5 8 0 . 0 6 1 0 . 0 5 5 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 0 9 1 0 . 0 8 1 0 . 0
e g n a R ] 5 7 1 . 0 ; 3 5 0 . 0 [ ] 4 0 . 0 ; 4 0 0 . 0 [ ] 1 . 0 ; 5 3 0 . 0 [ ] 6 2 0 . 0 ; 5 0 0 . 0 [ ] 8 3 0 . 0 ; 0 [ ] 5 5 0 . 0 ; 8 0 0 . 0 - [
e n o o B , ) 1 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 2 ( F M I , ) 9 9 9 1 ( l e d n i e t S d n a n o s g n i v d u L , ) 2 0 0 2 ( t u a t r e B : s e c r u o S l a t e y f f e B , ) 1 0 0 2 ( e d u a B , ) 8 9 9 1 ( . . l a t e . ) 1 0 0 2 (
Table 1
Estimates of elasticities with respect to equity wealth
Summary
– method 2 features an econometric estimate using
a reduced equation linking consumption and
wealth, see Baude (2001), Beffy et al. (2001),
Bertaut (2002), Boone et al. (1998), IMF World
Economic Outlook (2001);
– method 3 features an econometric estimate using
a structural model, see Bertaut (2002), Dauphin
(1997).
Despite difficulties measuring or interpreting the
correlation between stock market fluctuations and
changes in consumption, elasticity with respect to
equity wealth can be estimated at 0.05/0.1 in the
United States and the United Kingdom and at 0/0.03
in Japan, Germany, France and Italy.
These results obtained from the different sources
used show a certain degree of heterogeneity that
reflects the difficulty in accurately modelling
transmission channels of shocks from the financial
sector to the real economy.
– In order to make robust econometric estimates,
it is necessary to use long data series. Yet,
sufficiently long series are often unavailable
except for the United States. Moreover, estimates
of wealth effects are sensitive to the number of
variables, the size of the sample, the measure of
the wealth used (total financial wealth, financial
wealth or just equity wealth) and the measure
of consumption (nominal or real, the choice of
deflator).
– Financial market developments over the past two
decades might distort estimates: financial
deregulation may result in breaks in behaviour
patterns; a rise in volatility that increases
uncertainty as to future gains; asymmetric
volatility according to upward or downward stockDo asset price fluctuations constitute a risk to growth in the major industrialised countries?
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Chart 4
Stock market capitalisation ratios
(as % of GDP)
Sources: OECD, International Federation of Stock Exchanges
Chart 2
Technology indices
Source: DataStream (Thomson Financial)
Chart 3
Stock market indices in the United States
Source: DataStream (Thomson Financial)
price movements; an increase in household
equity holdings and a more homogeneous
distribution of household equity holdings; the
growth in tech stocks and the increase of their
share in household wealth.
– The impact of stock price fluctuations on
household consumption also depends on the
duration of the shock analysed. In general, there
is only a significant  impact if we assume that
the change in the stock price is lasting, which is
an artificial assumption: when faced with sudden
and substantial stock prices fluctuations,
economic agents naturally do not know whether
this movement will be sustainable.
While results differ depending on the method used,
they all show that the wealth effects are sizeable in
the United States and the United Kingdom, and are
less significant in Japan and the major euro area
countries. This asymmetry is chiefly due to:
– the greater share of equities in
US households’ asset portfolios (see below);
– the greater propensity of Anglo-Saxon countries to
consume out of wealth. In this respect, we observe
that, in general, the higher the stock market
capitalisation/GDP ratio, the greater the propensity
to consume out of wealth. At the end of 2002, this
ratio stood at 107% for the United Kingdom and
105% for the United States. It was much lower in
Japan (50%) and continental Europe: France (63%),
Germany (31%) and Italy (36%), even though it rose
the fastest in these countries.
Furthermore, the results obtained by Bertaut (2002)
point to the lag in the transmission of wealth effects
on consumption: between two to four years
according to the country. While after one quarter
wealth effects are almost undetectable, about 50%
can generally be observed at the end of the first
year and 75% after two years.
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1|3 Estimating wealth effects
arising from housing price
fluctuations
The theoretical housing price formation mechanism
corresponds to a classical balance between supply
and demand. In the short term, supply is rigid while
demand moves pro-cyclically with changes in
employment and income, causing prices to move
in the same direction. Supply then adjusts to demand
and prices stabilise at their equilibrium level.
Housing price fluctuations produce wealth effects
that can be more significant than those resulting
from stock price fluctuations of the same magnitude,
in view of the much larger proportion of real estate
holdings than equity holdings, even in the
United States.
However, if housing prices fall, the resulting
negative wealth effect is partially offset by an income
effect stemming from the fall in rents that usually
ensues from the decline in house prices, assuming
that rents are not paid to other households, but to
institutional sectors (non-financial corporations,
financial institutions, general government, etc.). The
higher the proportion of private homeowners, which
is notably the case in the United States and the
United Kingdom, the less this wealth effect will be
offset.
The impact of fluctuations in housing wealth on
household consumption is a relatively recent area
of study. Existing studies nevertheless vary in
nature.
– Some analyses use microeconomic data, from
surveys in which homeowners assess the value
of their property, with a slight bias from the
observed price but a high variance of the
estimated value. Moreover, their conclusions
vary: while Case (1992), Skinner (1989), and
Engelhardt (1996) identify wealth effects, Elliott
(1980) finds that they are not present.
– Case, Quigley and Shiller (2001) use aggregated
panel data for the major industrialised countries.
By expressing consumption as a function of
income, financial wealth and housing wealth,
they find in a robust manner that the wealth
effect resulting from the holding of real estate
assets is significant and overshadows that arising
from the holding of financial assets.
Table 2
Per capita consumption elasticities
in relation to income and wealth
e l b a s o p s i D
e m o c n i
y t i u q E
h t l a e w
g n i s u o H
h t l a e w
r o j a m l l A
s e i r t n u o c d e s i l a i r t s u d n i] 8 6 . 0 ; 4 2 . 0 [] 2 0 . 0 ; 2 0 . 0 - [] 7 1 . 0 ; 1 1 . 0 [
Source: Case, Quigley and Shiller (2001).
– However, Bertaut (2002), who uses the same type
of modelling, but on a country-by-country basis
(only the United States and the United Kingdom
due to the lack of comprehensive data for the
other countries), shows that consumption
elasticities in relation to stock prices and housing
prices are fairly similar.
Table 3
Impact on consumption of a lasting 20% rise in asset prices
s e c i r p k c o t Ss e c i r p g n i s u o H
s e t a t S d e t i n U] % 6 . 2 ; % 4 . 2 [] % 0 . 2 ; % 4 . 1 [
m o d g n i K d e t i n U% 0 6 . 1] % 4 . 2 ; % 0 . 2 [
Source: authors’ calculations using long-run equations estimated
by Bertaut (2002).
The conclusions of the most recent empirical studies
therefore suggest that wealth effects, which may arise
from changes in housing prices, must be taken into
account. The impact of housing price fluctuations
not only appears to be significant, but it may even
exceed the wealth effect generated by equity holdings.
1|4 International transmission
and spillover effects
Trends in household wealth reveal cyclical
movements that largely reflect stock price
fluctuations and seem fairly closely correlated
between different economies. Consequently, in view
of the globalisation of economies, it appears essential
to take account of the impact of an asset price shock
on consumers in other countries in order to assess
wealth effects.Do asset price fluctuations constitute a risk to growth in the major industrialised countries?
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These spillover effects are transmitted through two
main international transmission channels.
– The trade channel, as changes in stock prices in a
given country affect resident household wealth and
thus domestic consumption. Consequently, there
is an impact on the demand vis-à-vis partner
countries, on the activity of non-resident companies,
and on income and consumption in other countries.
These effects on activity are not limited to bilateral
trade but are transmitted via international trade to
the global economy as a whole.
– The financial channel, as changes in stock prices in
a given country affect the household wealth of
non-residents through portfolio investment and also
influence international capital flows, thus generating
exchange rate fluctuations that may impact on
demand vis-à-vis partner countries. However, this
channel has little influence if a shock of the same
magnitude is registered simultaneously on the stock
markets of all countries. Shifts are then made to
other financial products such as bonds rather than
to other equity markets, which could mechanically
lead to an general change in long-term interest rates.
1 This model is managed by the London-based “National Institute of Economic an Social Research”, and used by many private and public sector
organisations.
Overall, it is only possible to validly assess the
impact of an equity market shock on consumption
and growth using a multinational model such as
NiGEM1, as spillover effects combine with
domestic effects and are in some circumstances
significant.
Therefore, simulations carried out using NiGEM,
also taking account of the impact on corporate
investment, show that, at a given nominal interest
rate and exchange rate, under an adaptive
expectations assumption and without a budget
deficit target, the impact of a lasting 20% decline
in stock prices on the US annual average growth
rate would be -1.4 percentage point after one year
and -1.2 percentage point after two years. It would
be less pronounced in Japan (-0.6 percentage point
for both years) and in the euro area (-0.6 percentage
point the first year and -0.8 percentage point after
two years).
Table 4
The impact of a lasting 20% overall decline
in stock prices on GDP growth
without monetary policy responses
(difference with the baseline annual average percentage growth rate)
r e t f A
r a e y e n o
r e t f A
s r a e y o w t
s e t a t S d e t i n U4 . 1 -2 . 1 -
n a p a J 6 . 0 - 6 . 0 -
a e r a o r u E6 . 0 -8 . 0 -
Sources: NiGEM, authors’ calculations.
The asymmetry of results between the
United States and the euro area may reflect the
differences in the components of household
wealth and in the propensity to consume out of
their wealth. The rest of this study aims to
vindicate this interpretation, using an
international comparison of the financial position
of households (United States, Japan,
United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy).Do asset price fluctuations constitute a risk to growth in the major industrialised countries?
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Box 1
The impact of a stock market shock on economic growth
The main impact of a fall in stock prices is a decline in household wealth. Households are thus liable to
increase savings and reduce consumption and housing investment. This results in a slowdown in demand
in individual countries, which is then transmitted through international trade from one economy to the
other, thereby amplifying this phenomenon.
The multinational NiGEM model enables us to quantify these direct and indirect impacts. In view of the
difficulties entailed in accurately modelling the transmission channels of shocks from the financial sphere to
the real economy, these findings should be interpreted with caution. They depend on the theoretical choices
underlying the structure of the model and the assumptions required for evaluation (variations in interest
rates and exchange rates, types of expectations, etc.).
In order to identify a significant impact of the changes in stock prices on household consumption and
economic growth, the quantification of these impacts is based on the assumption of a lasting fall in stock
prices, i.e. for a simulation period of up to 30 years in the NiGEM model. We should once again stress the
artificial nature of this assumption: when economic agents are faced with a change in stock prices, especially
a sharp and sudden one, they naturally do not know how long it will last. This assumption is consequently
tantamount to assuming that stock prices are fixed by the authorities in the same way as exchange rates in
a fixed-rate system.
All in all, wealth effects associated with the holding of stocks only appear significant in the United States,
and perhaps in other “Anglo-Saxon” countries, such as the United Kingdom. In the major euro area countries
(Germany, France, and Italy), they seem to be only marginal.
However, even in the United States, wealth effects associated with the holding of stocks are only apparent in
the long term if at all, and are therefore impossible to anticipate. In the short term, they seem largely
supplanted by the wealth effects associated with housing wealth, whose value is much less volatile than that
of stock portfolios.
The financial position of households appears to
become more solid when:
– assets are high and borrowings are low, or net
wealth is significant;
– and the proportion of risky assets, and in
particular equities, is low.
2| International comparison
of the financial position of households
2|1 A balance sheet approach
We conducted the analysis of the financial position
of households using a simplified balance sheet
approach (see Appendix, assessment of 2001).
s t e s s A s e i t i l i b a i L
s t e s s a l a i c n a n i F s n a o l m r e t - m u i d e m d n a - t r o h S
s e i t i u q E –
s r e h t O –
s t e s s a l a i c n a n i f - n o N s n a o l m r e t - g n o L
) - ( s g n i w o r r o b t e n r o ) + ( h t l a e w t e N
l a t o T l a t o TDo asset price fluctuations constitute a risk to growth in the major industrialised countries?
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2|2 Financial wealth
Expressed as a percentage of disposable income,
holdings of financial assets have increased
sharply in all countries between 1991 and 2001: by
55 percentage points in Italy, 62 percentage points
in Germany, 70 percentage points in the
United States, 88 percentage points in Japan,
97 percentage points in France and by
100 percentage points in the United Kingdom.
However, the ratio varies as countries can be
classified in two homogeneous sub-groupings in
this respect: on the one hand, the United States,
Japan and the United Kingdom where the weight
of financial assets held by households has
constantly been relatively high; and Germany,
France and Italy, on the other, where the weight of
financial assets held by households is lower, even
though it has been increasing more rapidly than in
the first group.
Box 2
Households’ balance sheet: definitions and sources
Households: individuals and non-profit institutions serving them.
Financial assets: economic assets comprising means of payment and financial claims, excluding pension claims:
– shares: listed or unlisted shares and other equity, and mutual fund units/shares;
– securities excluding shares;
– others:
– currency and deposits,
– loans,
– insurance technical reserves,
– other accounts receivable/payable, corresponding to financial assets serving as counterparts to financial
and nonfinancial transactions for which a gap exists between the time of transaction and the time of the
corresponding payment.
Non-financial assets: property at market value and stocks of durable goods at replacement cost.
Loans: credit extended to households by credit institutions, which households are obliged to repay.
Net wealth: financial and non-financial assets minus loans; this reflects households’ ability to provide collateral.
The data used correspond to year-end nominal outstandings. They are also expressed as a percentage of
households’ nominal gross disposable income. They are obtained from statistics in the appendix of the OECD
Economic Outlook.Do asset price fluctuations constitute a risk to growth in the major industrialised countries?
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More specifically, in the case of equity holdings
(excluding indirect holdings, such as pension fund
holdings), the position of US households appears
particular. In 2001, shares accounted 22% of their
net wealth compared with 16% in the three largest
euro area countries, 12% in the United Kingdom
and only 4% in Japan.
This situation not only reflects the lower degree of
risk aversion in the United States than elsewhere,
but also in general a better stock market
performance than other stock markets: between
1995 and 2000, stock prices tripled as measured by
the Dow Jones in the United States, the CAC 40 in
France and the Dax in Germany, while in the case
of the other two main indices, stock prices only
doubled in the United Kingdom and fell by over 20%
in Japan. US households therefore appear to be more
exposed to equity market shocks.
2|3 Wealth and housing loans
In the United Kingdom and the United States,
housing prices and loans have risen sharply.
Notably, in recent years, the losses that
US households suffered on their equity holdings
were offset by the increase in their real estate assets
(i.e. by about one-third in 2002). In Germany, prices
have been stable since 1995 but housing loans have
continued to rise substantially. Conversely, in
France, housing prices have risen significantly
while the housing loans/disposable income ratio
has hardly fluctuated.
Chart  8
Shares held by households and stock prices
in the United States
(as  a percentage of disposable income)
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1,000
3,000
5,000
7,000
9,000
11,000
Shares (left-hand scale)
Dow Jones (right-hand scale)
13,000
Sources: Sources: OECD, Federal Reserve, authors’ calculations
The risk of a real estate bubble appears when there
is a simultaneous increase in prices and loans.
Indeed, a speculative trend, fuelled by a continuous
rise in borrowing, can keep pushing prices up,
creating a real estate bubble. Such a risk cannot be
ignored in the United Kingdom and the United
States.
The high level of household borrowing in the
United States and in the United Kingdom, fostered
by the rise in housing prices, exposes these
economies to the risk of a sudden correction in
private consumption. However, interest rate cuts
have enabled households to renegotiate their
mortgage loans, obtaining better conditions, and to
keep debt servicing under control. Such a trend
could be triggered, for example, by a downturn in
housing prices that could generate negative wealth
effects and make access to bank loans more difficult
due to the fall in value of the collateral used to obtain
the loan. The weakening of the financial position of
households resulting from the bursting of a real
estate bubble would be exacerbated in the United
States and in the United Kingdom by the fact that
some consumer loans are backed by real estate
assets.
2|4 Total debt and net wealth
Balance sheet structures in 2001 reveal that
Japanese and UK households are overall the most
indebted, i.e. 130% and 133% of their disposable
income respectively. Then follow UK and GermanDo asset price fluctuations constitute a risk to growth in the major industrialised countries?
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households, with debt ratios of 119% and 112%
respectively. The German situation therefore
differs considerably from that observed in France
and Italy where household debt stands at only 76%
and 35% of their disposable income respectively.
With the exception of these two countries,
household debt has tended to rise since the start of
the 1990s. In particular, Germany has registered
the fastest growth in household debt of the
six countries, ahead of the United States.
Over the more recent period, American households
have maintened a very high level of debt, i.e. 133%
of their disponible income in 2002. Indeed,
US household debt continued to grow throughout
2002 at an annual rate of between 8% and 9%, in an
environment of low interest rates and rapidly rising
house prices (7.7% in 2002 after 5.8% in 2001).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the
US household debt burden has stabilised since the
end of 2001, at around 14% of their disposable
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income, with the latter increasing substantially
thanks to tax breaks and better mortgage repayment
conditions obtained on the back of interest rate cuts.
Furthermore, the net wealth/disposable income
ratio of households has converged and is fairly
similar across countries, despite the heterogeneous
nature of their balance sheet structures: 755% in
Japan, 664% in the United Kingdom, 631% in France,
569% in Germany, 553% in the United States and
714% in Italy. In particular, in Japan, this ratio has
declined significantly since the start of the 1990s,
but remains slightly above the levels reached in
other countries. Conversely, it has risen more
markedly in the United Kingdom than in other
countries as of 1994, mainly as a result of the more
pronounced increase in housing prices.
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During periods when assets appreciate, such as 1995
to 2000, net wealth only grows if the increase in
assets prices is not offset by greater indebtedness.
In this respect, the financial position of households
in the major euro area countries and the
United Kingdom seems more solid than in the
United States. Since the mid-1990s, net household
wealth has not risen in the United States as much
as in the United Kingdom, and just slightly more
than in the euro area despite the fact that US stock
markets posted more significant gains. Overall,
growth in households’ net wealth in the United States
in the 1990s appears weak with respect to the rise
in the Dow Jones.
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Empirical studies on wealth effects show that outside of the United States and the United Kingdom,
wealth effects are fairly limited despite the spillover effects generated by their international
transmission, either directly through financial markets, or indirectly through international trade.
These results seem consistent with those obtained using other quantitative approaches. In this context,
Avouyi-Dovi et Matheron (2003) analyse the co-movements between business and financial cycles
using two methods, one consisting in identifying the turning points of activity indicators (real GDP
and real consumption) and stock markets, and the other in breaking down the individual indicators
into trend and cyclical components. Notably, they conclude that there is not a high degree of dependence
between economic growth and asset price fluctuations in the short term, except for the United States.
The assessment of households’ financial position reveals that there is a certain degree of heterogeneity
at the international level in economic agents’ investment and debt behaviour. In particular, this
stems from the existing disparities in terms of risk aversion, financial structures, tax systems, pension
systems and one-off factors such as the financial consequences of German unification. Overall, it
appears that Anglo-Saxon households have a greater appetite for debt and risky assets than in other
countries.
It is therefore not surprising that the shocks affecting asset prices have a greater effect on household
consumption and growth in Anglo-Saxon countries than in the major euro area countries or Japan.Do asset price fluctuations constitute a risk to growth in the major industrialised countries?
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Appendix
Households’ financial balance sheet in 2001
(as a % of gross disposable income and of the balance sheet total)
Sources: OECD et authors’ calculations
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